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* REVIEWS
CHINA’a ECONOMY AND THE MAOIST 
STRATEGY, by John G. Gurley, Monthly 
Review Preaa, New York and London, 1976.
John Gurley has an impeccable background as a 
‘straight’ economist having been managing editor 
o f the prestigious journal the A m erican  
Econom ic Review from 1963 to 1968, but his 
writings on China since the late 1960’s have been 
those of a committed leftist disillusioned with the 
answers provided by conventional economics. The 
book under review contains eight essays of uneven 
length and interest, ranging from a short 
consideration of the Chinese financial system to a 
long account of the formation of Mao’s economic 
strategy in the base areas before Liberation. It is 
an odd collection. No less than five of the essays 
have been published before, and the most 
important of them (chapter 1) has already been 
widely read and is still easily available. Chapter 3 
consists entirely of book reviews and takes up 
almost one-third o f the whole volume. The essays 
do not progress logically from one subject to 
another, and the major themes appear in much the 
same form in several places.
What of the content? At its heart is Gurley’s deep 
concern with the inadequacies of capitalist 
development in the third world, and he is quite 
rightly most impressed by the experience of China 
since 1949. He wrote an influential piece on this 
Bubject in the late 1960’s. It is this which forms the 
first and I think the most important chapter of the 
book. It was written at a time when to express 
sympathy for China was regarded as ‘dangerous’ 
rather than ‘chic’. Its central message is simple 
and powerfully expressed: “The truth, is that 
China over the past two decades has made very 
remarkable economic advances (though not 
steady) on almost all fronts. The basic overriding 
economic fact about China is that for twenty years 
it has fed, clothed, and housed everyone, has kept 
them healthy and has educated most. Millions 
have not starved; sidewalks and streets have not 
been covered with multitudes of sleeping, hungry, 
and illiterate human beings; millions are not 
disease-ridden. To find such deplorable conditions 
one does not look to China these days but rather to 
India, Pakistan, and almost anywhere else in the 
underdeveloped world. These facts are so basic, so
fundamentally important, that they completely 
dominate China’s economic picture, even if one 
grants all of the erratic and irrational policies 
alleged by its numerous critics.” (p.13).
No matter which period one looks at in China’s 
post-Liberation history this story is basically true; 
it is an enormous achievement. Moreover, the 
dilemmas of capitalist development in the third 
world are still with us to-day. A recent World Bank 
annual report noted that while many 
underdeveloped countries had achieved 
respectable growth rates, “statistics conceal the 
gravity of the underlying economic and social 
problems, which are typified by severely skewed 
income distribution, excessive levels of 
unemployment, high rates of infant mortality, low 
rates of literacy, serious malnutrition, and 
widespread ill-health.” (quoted in Gurley, pp.259- 
60). Gurley emphasises the fact that the Chinese 
achievement is dependent on the political 
revolution of 1949 which brought into being a 
planned economy controlled by a group o f people 
sympathetic to improving the livelihood of the 
mass of the population. He is surely correct in his 
scepticism concerning the possible applications of 
the ‘Chinese strategy’ in a piecemeal context in 
countries that have not undergone that political 
revolution (chapter 8; Is the Chinese Model 
Diffusible?).
T think that real problems occur when Gurley 
moves beyond this level of analysis. In the first 
place he focuses almost entirely on Mao 
personally. Of course no-one could seriously deny 
that Mao is the most important character in 
Chinese politics since liberation (and indeed in 
the twentieth century), but his policies have by no 
means met with uncritical acceptance either inside 
or outside the party. Gurley comes close-ai times to 
implying that ‘Mao’s strategy’ and thfe Chinese 
strategy’ are synonymous, and he certainly does 
not provide an adequate account of the intense 
struggles inside the party over the correct ‘line’ to 
pursue, yet these have been at the centre of poBt- 
Liberation politics. Thus I think one would be 
hard-put from Gurley’s book to make head or tail of 
the events in China over the last year or so. I do not 
think this can be entirely blamed on an excessive 
concentration on the positions adopted by Mao, 
since a full consideration of those should involve
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an analysis of the conflicts out of which Mao’s 
approach has evolved.
More important perhaps than this is the 
simplicity of Gurley’s approach to politics in 
China, compared with his sophistication in 
economic judgments. There is literally not one 
critical comment on China’s politics or cultural 
policies - no suggestion that the enormous 
economic and social achievements he describes 
have had any costs in other areas, and of course, 
no attempt to analyse the degree to which the 
tightness of political control and the limitations on 
cultural freedom were indeed necessary. These are 
surely rather important questions for a marxist to 
ask. Gurley rightly rejects the criteria used by so 
many Western social scientists, who, he says, have 
been guilty of a “general failure to deal with China 
on its own terms, within the framework of its own 
goals and its own methods for attaining those 
goals.” (p. 16) Unfortunately on the political front I 
think Gurley Bimply accepts at face value the 
frame o f reference set by the Chinese translated 
press, which is not much of an improvement on 
looking at China through the lens of 'bourgeois 
social science’ . A full appraisal of China should be 
one that does indeed ‘judge’ by its own frame of 
reference, not by China’s, that looks at her ‘warts 
and all’ , but that is capable of understanding why 
the shortcomings are there, and possibly 
accepting that in a world of ‘second best’ the 
‘Chinese path’ is a much better one than thatof the 
capitalist underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, 
if things are as rosy as Gurley implies, then 
struggles such as the Cultural Revolution - which 
was precisely about the political ‘warts’ • become 
much leBS comprehensible.
I should like to pursue this point a little further. 
Gurley unhesitatingly characterises China as a 
socialist state, and that China has socialist 
features is undeniable: “the major means of 
production are owned collectively .... from the 
nation down to production brigades and teams” 
(p.311), and there is “a heavy measure of economic 
planning, in which the major decisions are made 
by planning authorities (national and local) rather 
than by the market outcomes of many individual 
actions” (p.311). However, Gurley also claims that 
“The proletariat has political power” (p.310). It is 
incumbent on him to provide hard evidence of such 
an important claim: on the amount say that 
workers have in running their workplace, on the 
degree of representation they have on regional and 
national planning bodies, on the degree of 
independence of workers’ organisations, on how 
much freedom of debate there is inside the 
Communist Party, how much democracy there is 
in the way that party committees are elected, and 
the degree of control that the party committee has 
in the workplace.
Frankly, insofar as Gurley does attempt an 
answer to these and similar questions, he does not 
progress far beyond the level of cliches: ‘The post­
revolutionary Chinese economy has been 
distinguished primarily by ■— the political power 
of the workers and peasants and their control of 
the production process’ (p.121); ‘a distinctive 
feature of "Maoism” is its “mass line” , which is a 
method of involving the masses in policy 
formulation and implementation’ (p.71); ‘within 
the framework of Marxism-Leninism, individuals 
(in China) are involved in a dynamic process of 
gaining freedom, in the sense of becoming fully 
aware of the world around them, responding 
rationally to it, and engaging in active decision­
making in regard to their own lives’ (p.8); and so 
on. There is no doubt that they have tried hard to 
achieve them; indeed, the attempt to do this in a 
poor backward country is an important one for 
socialist to understand. However, the Maoists 
have been heavily circumscribed in their attempts 
by China's underdevelopment and by the need for 
strong control economically and politically to lift 
her out of it in a relatively humane fashion. A  more 
suitable analysis of Maoism is surely one which 
brings out the tensions and contradictions of its 
objectives rather than one that effectively sweeps 
them under the carpet.
I thought that there were serious flaws in this 
book in other respects also. Firstly, virtually no 
mention is made throughout its 325 pages of 
China’s foreign policy, other than in relation to the 
Soviet Union. At the very least, China’s actions 
need explaining. Gurley chideB the bourgeois 
social scientists for not following Hegel’s dictum, 
‘the truth is the whole’ (p.l 1) but he does not do so 
himself. Secondly, his characterisation of the 
Soviet Union suffers from the same tendency 
noted above, namely to simply accept what the 
translated Chinese press says. We are told in good 
Peking Review style that a “capitalist restoration” 
has occurred in Russia (p.205). To characterise a 
society in which there is virtually no private 
ownership of the means of production and in 
which production is primarily for use not 
exchange, as a ‘capitalist’ society, is surely a gross 
misuse of the word ‘capitalist’. Unquestionably, 
there are classes in the Soviet Union, with 
‘congealed’ inequalities in the .distribution of 
control over the means ot production and of 
personal income, but so were there in slave and 
feudal societies.
A third flaw I feel is his treatment of the peasant 
questions. There is obviously a populist strand to 
Man’s thinking, but I think Gurley caricatures 
Mao's view when he says that “Maoism is a vision 
of rusticity, of social development in thousands of 
small but integrated units, each springing from 
the uncorrupted soil of the countryside’ (pp.227-8). 
China has indeed pursued a policy of developing 
small scale rural industries and has tried to limit 
the growth of large cities. There is a sound
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economic rationale behind both of these policies, 
at least at the present stage of development. 
However, the impact of these policies should not be 
exaggerated. It is estimated, for example, that in 
1972 the small-scale sector contributed under 10 
per cent of total factory output value in China, and 
that the industrial output value of the three largest 
cities (Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin) has grown 
rapidly throughout the post-Liberation period 
(total output in billions of 1952 yuan: 1952 - 9; 1957 - 
19.6; 1973 - 94.9). (2) I think Gurley (perhaps, 
unintentionally) misleads the unwary reader into 
imagining that heavy, large-scale, urban 
industries have been de-emphasised in China in a 
way that they have not been; Mao, after all, 
advocated ‘walking on two legs’, not one.
Related to this is his approach to the Cultural 
Revolution, where he appears to be simply 
factually wrong. He claims that ‘the real locus of 
power' for Mao in the Cultural Revolution was ‘the 
peasants in the socialist countryside’ (pp.221-1) 
and that Mao ‘called upon the peasants in the 
socialist countryside and young people 
everywhere to transform the cities from capitalist 
into socialist centres’ (p.22). He even suggests that 
while Mao’s ‘peasant based movement had 
implanted socialism with some success in the 
countryside (in the 1950s),.— the urban areas had 
still not been fully incorporated into the socialist 
movement’ (p.22). This really is a strange view. 
Most sources stress that the impact of the Cultural 
Revolution in the countryside was much less than 
in the towns. Moreover, far from being more 
socialist than the urban areas, I think it is quite 
clear that peasant conservatism has been one of 
the fundamental problems for China since 
Liberation. China has resolved the production 
question much better than the Soviet Union did, 
but has still been left with an ideological ‘Achilles 
Heel' in the shape of a relative stasis in production 
relations in the countryside since the early 1960s, 
when, far from being the bastion of socialism, 
there was a widespread breakdown of the 
collective economy. One has only to look at the 
strength of support for the 'Gang of Four’ in the 
countryside relative to the towns to realise the 
inaccuracy of Gurley’s view (the base of their 
support has come from the Shanghai workers).
What then are we left with? Despite the 
shortcomings I have indicated, it remains the case 
that this is an eminently readable collection of 
essays, by someone who feels deeply about the 
problems of underdevelopment. It also has some 
penetrating insights into the economic rationale 
for China’s development policy. It does, however, 
leave me disappointed yet again at the failure of a 
left-winger to produce a genuine ‘political 
economy’ analysis of China’s development since 
Liberation. On the one hand there are radical 
economists such as Gurley who often write 
movingly and (less often) perceptively about the 
Chinese model, in development economics terms.
but who have a naive approach to C hinese politics. 
On the other hand, there are those socialists who 
are correctly  critica l o f China at the 
superstructural level, but who fail to attribute 
adequate importance to the enormous 
achievements at other levels, who often 
inadequately assess the constraints within which 
poor countries such as China operate, and who 
frequently fail to recognise the serious attempts 
made under Mao to resolve the very shortcomings 
that they highlight. (3) I can think of only one 
work, that by Franz Schurmann (Ideology and 
Organisation in Communist China) (4) that 
comes close to the breadth of vision that a socialist 
analysis requires.
FOOTNOTES
1. Thomas G. Rawski, Chinese Economic 
Planning in Current Scene, April 1976, Vol. 
14, No. 4, p. 5.
2. R.M. Field, N.R. Lardy, and J.P. Emerson, 
Industrial Output by Province in China, 
1949-73, in China Quarterly, September 
1975, No. 63, pp. 422-3.
3. A good example here is Lavio Matain’s Party 
Army and Masses in China, New Left 
Books, London, 1976.
4. Franz Schurmann, I d e o l o g y  and 
Organisat ion in Com m unist China, 
University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1968.
- PETER N O LA N
$ *  *
